

# MASS VICTIMIZATION

## PROMISING AVENUES FOR PREVENTION



FBI Academy, Quantico, VA



# Mass Victimization: Promising Avenues for Prevention

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<sup>1</sup> The affiliations and titles of personnel noted here were correct at the time this document was drafted. This information may have changed in the interim between the initial drafts and the final date of publication.

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# Mass Victimization: Promising Avenues for Prevention

## Introduction

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Traditionally, law enforcement's role in mass victimization incidents has been more reactive than proactive, and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have developed tactics, training, and policies designed to ensure a swift, effective response capability. The need to develop efforts to assist in preventing such incidents is now recognized, and it is hoped that this document can highlight the benefits of pursuing preventative courses of action. If any specific or general strategies could contribute to preventing another tragedy like what happened in Charleston, South Carolina in June of 2015; Newtown, Connecticut in December, 2012; or Aurora, Colorado in July, 2012, then this effort will have been worthwhile.

Unfortunately, a predictive model for preventing all future mass victimization incidents cannot be provided— all situations and individuals involved pose complex and variable environmental factors and contextual details to consider. Therefore, any promising avenues for prevention must include specific considerations to be made and questions to be answered. Each community and jurisdiction throughout the country is likely to be different, and the viability of any given preventative strategy must be determined locally.

As such, this document is focused on identifying strategies that contribute to preventing, not predicting, incidents of targeted violence that result in mass casualty events.<sup>2</sup> In order to achieve this end, perhaps an appropriate course of analysis is to examine these incidents through a common lens of threat assessment. Typically, the term “threat assessment” in this context is used to “describe the set of investigative and operational techniques that can be used by law enforcement professionals to identify, assess, and manage the risks of targeted violence and its potential perpetrators” (Fein, Vossekuil, & Holden, 1995). Of course, one of the critical issues is separating those who “make” idle threats from those who “pose” legitimate threats. Managing this distinction and responding appropriately may be a significant cultural shift for some law enforcement agencies. That is, participating in a threat assessment team and taking proactive steps to prevent violent incidents departs significantly from a reactive strategy that does not generally mobilize until the threat has been realized. Creating relationships with the community so that individuals feel more comfortable reporting concerns to law enforcement or some other authority is perhaps the single most important step toward effective prevention.

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<sup>2</sup> “Targeted violence” is defined as an incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent attack (Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. (1998).

## Background

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The information reported here is the result of a multi-agency collaborative conference held at Quantico, Virginia, in August of 2013. This effort was prompted by a number of factors including, but not limited to, numerous mass casualty events that transpired prior to this conference; efforts by other local, state, and federal authorities to examine this problem and find solutions to preventing the next event; a concerted effort by the White House to leverage federal resources to better assist local communities in both prevention and response to such tragedies; and specific efforts by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to offer active shooter response training, as well as provide significant and abundant investigative resources to communities touched by such incidents when they occur. This document is intended to complement these efforts at all levels of government.

To achieve this goal, the conference was divided into specific parts to foster the identification of possible avenues for prevention. The first of these were case briefings of several mass casualty incidents. The purpose of these briefings was not to recount that these take place in a variety of settings; rather, the briefings focused on the offenders' trajectories to violence and on lessons learned for informing future detection and disruption efforts. As such, much speculation about the background and trajectory of events that took place were examined. Many "what if" or "if only" questions and comments were raised. Each of these case briefings provided some perspective for considering whether such contingencies could be ferreted out and acted upon on a wide enough scale and on a regular enough basis to spell out a potential avenue for preventing future incidents. The second part of the program was devoted to exercises involving small group examinations of specific scenarios that resulted in violent incidents causing mass casualties. The incidents were fictional but were compilations of factors found in actual observed cases. These exercises were designed to extract potential avenues for prevention that communities may find fruitful. Such avenues may not only respond to a mass casualty threat by preventing the next incident, but they may also create healthier communities with reduced crime.

What follows are seven promising avenues for prevention that emerged from this effort. Accompanying each of these promising avenues is not only a summary of a preventive strategy thought to be viable, but also references to both academic and practitioner evidence that suggests such efforts may be effective in curbing violence in our communities and providing the initial foundation for an evidence-based approach to this topic.

## Promising Prevention Strategies

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1. Prepare – Preparation is essential. A mass victimization event can happen anywhere at any time.
2. Utilize multidisciplinary efforts to increase the likelihood of success.
3. Enhance and maintain open lines of communication between law enforcement and the local community.
4. Create and manage a threat assessment team or equivalent capability.
5. Support and advance education and awareness efforts in the community.
6. Understand the myths of mental illness.
7. Conduct table top exercises devoted to preventing these events from occurring in the community.

## 1. Prepare – Preparation is essential. A mass victimization event can happen anywhere at any time.

*“We won’t be able to stop every violent act, but if there is even one thing that we can do to prevent any of these events, we have a deep obligation, all of us, to try.” – President Barack Obama*

Mass victimization events are events which result in multiple casualties. According to the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, a mass killing refers to “[three] or more killings in a single incident” in a public space.<sup>3</sup> Examples of recent mass victimization events include the shootings in Charleston, SC, Newtown, CT, Tucson, AZ and Aurora, CO. Since mass victimization events are relatively rare, the notion that “it could never happen here” often persists. It is important to note, however, that a mass victimization event can happen anywhere at any time. Additionally, the media has also played a role in the public’s perceptions of mass victimization events. While these events are relatively rare, some argue that the focus of media coverage inevitably shifts away from reporting what happened to focusing upon what could have been done to prevent the event. However, little attention is typically paid to the critical efforts required to adequately prepare for these events and implement procedures to ensure public safety in the event of a mass victimization<sup>4</sup>.

This is when behavioral threat assessment becomes essential to increase preparedness and improve prevention efforts.

Similarly, *USA Today* reported that while the public believes mass killings are increasing, the number of mass killings in 2013 is similar to the number in 2006 and called it a typical year.<sup>5</sup> More recently, an FBI study (see Blair & Schweit, 2014) reported a steady increase from 2000 to 2013 in incidents involving active shooters. While active shooter incidents may not necessarily always result in mass casualties, these types of news reports influence the public’s perceptions of the frequency of mass victimization. In reality, the media rarely utilizes official data in their coverage of these kinds of incidents and official data reflective of mass casualty events are elusive (See Huff-Corzine et al., 2014). In response to the school shooting in Newtown, CT in December 2012, the Office of the President issued a plan to reduce gun violence. This plan included “1) closing background check loopholes to keep guns out of dangerous hands, 2) banning military-style assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, and taking other steps to reduce gun violence, 3) making schools safer and 4) increasing access to mental health

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<sup>3</sup> Once enacted this became 28 U.S.Code Subsection 530C(b)(1).

<sup>4</sup> See especially Scanlon (2011) and Schildkraut & Muschert (2014) for additional discussion of media framing and portrayals of disasters.

<sup>5</sup> Welsh & Hoyer (2013, December); Schildkraut (2012); Schildkraut & Muschert (2014)



services.”<sup>6</sup> Since that time, several federal initiatives have yielded further guidance pertaining to planning and preparedness efforts for preventing and responding to mass casualty events. In particular, three guides have been available since 2013 for developing high quality emergency response plans for situations that may emerge in schools, houses of worship, and institutes of higher learning.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has focused multiple efforts on response and recovery support for law enforcement officers at the federal, state, and local levels. All of these efforts, no matter where quartered, contribute to not only prevention capabilities but also response and community recovery efforts that ensue when these tragedies do occur. Planning for all of these aspects of a potential mass victimization incident clearly pays its rewards both in interdiction efforts, as well as in the aftermath of an incident.

Nonetheless, planning and preparing for such events comes at a cost, as well. However, one adage offered by Benjamin Franklin may be most relevant here: “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” While the cost of crime and the cost of preventing crime are vigorously debated, there are at least two aspects of fiscal concern that are relevant to debates pertaining to mass casualty events. Of course there is no way to calculate the emotional damage, psychological trauma, and community grief that unfolds in the aftermath of such events. Clearly there is no cost too great to ensure the safety of our communities, yet the symposium participants acknowledged the realities of budgeting appropriately in austere economic climates continues to be a challenge in many threat assessment efforts. Nonetheless, two aspects of cost are relevant here. The first aspect is the estimated cost of past events and the second aspect is the cost of liabilities that may be incurred if prevention efforts are not pursued.

When it comes to focusing upon mass casualty events, such as those considered here, there is no single authoritative source for estimating the cost of events like Newtown, CT, Aurora, CO, and Tucson, AZ. There are anecdotal estimates (Deisinger, 2013) that suggest the costs associated with the Virginia Tech incident were approximately 60 million dollars, to date.<sup>8</sup> Attorney General Holder authorized that \$2.5 million be paid for just forensics, overtime and security to the myriad of agencies that responded in the aftermath of the tragedy at Sandy Hook elementary in Newtown, CT. Additionally, the incident at Virginia Tech incurred fines for the university’s alleged delayed response to the event, accounting for monetary losses of as much as \$100,000 to each family affected by the loss of a family member associated with the mass shooting at Norris Hall in 2007.

In addition to these costs related to financial losses suffered by both individuals and communities, there is also the potential cost for civil litigation that will likely emerge in the aftermath of any event that may occur. This was the case after the Virginia Tech incident and

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<sup>6</sup> Office of the President of the United States (2013). See <https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/preventing-gun-violence>.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, Washington, DC, 2013.

<sup>8</sup> See Green & Cooper (2012). Available from the Center for American Progress at [www.americanprogress.org](http://www.americanprogress.org)

likely was the case in many other incidents that have occurred throughout the nation. As such, preventive efforts taken by a community and its members may reduce the legal burdens in the aftermath that are likely to arise. That is, the community will have taken steps to potentially prevent such incidents rather than neglecting such possibilities. By doing so, the legal consequences may be mitigated if the community both acknowledges such an incident may occur and takes preventative steps to avoid such occurrences.

While fiscal considerations are not the driving force in determining public safety, the realities of the costs associated with pursuing promising avenues for preventing mass casualty events are relevant in that the creation of threat assessment capabilities, table top exercises, community meetings, and community training events to proactively respond to the threat of such incidents all have costs of their own. While some of these financial outlays can be offset by grants and other resources that may be identified to enable such prevention efforts, the fact remains that the cost of pursuing some of these avenues toward preventing mass casualty events can be substantial for an agency, particularly when many police agencies are operating on a “do more with less” budget in the current economic climate. However, such costs are miniscule relative to the costs in lives and dollars that will likely be suffered if such an incident were to occur in any given community. While public safety resources are always precious, this may be a specific example, much like countering terrorism, where the benefits of attempting to prevent such outcomes far outweigh both the costs and consequences of not exploring all possible avenues toward preventing mass casualty incidents as discussed here. Initial financial outlays to establish services, provide training and construct infrastructure may appear overwhelming and unnecessary, but when weighed against the costs associated with a mass casualty incident—to include the financial, emotional and other costs to the community as a whole—those initial financial outlays will likely prove to be a profitable investment paid out in controlled, and planned, amounts. In other words, addressing the avenues presented here should be viewed as a form of risk management or risk mitigation to reduce or prevent future liability and incidents, and as a valuable means of protecting the community, rather than as an unnecessary expense.

Along this line, some resources have become available to assist in responding to situations such as these. On an individual level, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has recommended a set of guidelines for individuals to respond to an active shooter situation. DHS recommends being aware of one’s surroundings and possible dangers, knowing the two closest exits, securing the door if one is in an office, getting into the nearest room and securing the door if one is in a hallway, and as a final resort, attempting to incapacitate the shooter. They also provide additional guidelines on how to respond when law enforcement personnel arrive at the scene.<sup>9</sup> Whether it is an academic facility or workplace setting, it is essential for individuals to be aware of the facility’s plan for emergency situations. The Federal Emergency Management

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<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2015). See also <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-incidents> as well as <http://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness> for numerous additional resources and guidance relative to both active shooters and mass casualty incidents.

Agency (FEMA) provides training on how to respond to mass casualty situations. Additionally, there should be a plan to inform the public about these situations immediately after a mass victimization situation unfolds. For instance, colleges and universities are required to inform students promptly of any threats in the community per the Clery Act (1990), which will be discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this report.

Lastly, in conjunction with Texas State University, the FBI has expanded existing efforts to develop and deliver an ongoing program of training entitled Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (or ALERRT). This training is offered free of charge across the country and is specifically devoted to law enforcement efforts to neutralize the active threat to life and limb, as well as pointing to avenues for more effective response to these tragedies.

All of the above efforts, whether aimed at individual capacities, organizational plans, or law enforcement tactics and strategies, are centered upon the unfortunate but real fact that these incidents can happen anywhere at any time. This makes preparation even more crucial to limit the likelihood of an event occurring and mediating the loss of life if one does occur.

### *Questions to Consider*

- How and why should this law enforcement agency begin a plan for preparedness in my community?
- How can members of my community overcome the notion that mass victimization events do not occur here?
- How does media coverage influence my community's perceptions of mass victimization events?
- How can an individual member of my community prepare for a potential mass victimization event? What can my school do? What can I do?
- What would it cost to explore some of the prevention efforts discussed here in my community?
- What resources are available for offsetting these costs?
- Can existing crime prevention efforts be leveraged to respond to this potential threat?
- Are there any available resources (local, state, federal, or private funding) that are available to initiate some of the prevention avenues delineated here?
- What is the cost of doing nothing?

Additional resources:

- Davie (1990)
- Gottfredson & Gottfredson (2001)
- Graham et al. (2006)
- Lindsay & Murray (2009)
- Paparazzo, Eith, & Tocco (2013)
- Rogers & Chappeli (2003)
- Schafer et al. (2010)
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (2013)

## 2. Utilize multidisciplinary prevention efforts to increase the likelihood of success.

*“The police are the public and the public are the police.” – Sir Robert Peele*

*Preventing mass casualty events similar to curbing general crime and disorder is a community-wide problem and should involve every relevant agency, community group, and citizen that can provide valuable input to such efforts.*

Crime prevention has long been a priority in law enforcement and other public safety agencies. Well documented efforts have been produced that outline both the need for such efforts, as well as the importance of involving not just crime fighters but also medical, social, economic, political, and community leaders to achieve success in any crime curbing efforts. Among some examples of these efforts is COMPSTAT in New York City; Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia; Weed and Seed efforts throughout various jurisdictions across the United States; and nationwide efforts in the 1990s to foster and extend community-oriented policing efforts. Conference attendee reviews of these efforts noted that one commonality in the success of such approaches is believed to be the multidisciplinary nature of the design and tailored implementation of these community and national strategies to individual localities.

Recent literature on policing has examined the role of police legitimacy in building collective efficacy in a community (Kochel, 2012). LaFree (1998) suggests that police legitimacy has a strong influence on the ability for police to build and promote collective efficacy. According to Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997), collective efficacy refers to a sense of cohesion and trust among residents of a neighborhood, which allows for an expectation of reciprocity among neighbors to use informal social control to deter crime and disorder. This concept of collective

efficacy emphasizes the need for input from multiple resources within the community to ensure prevention efforts are encompassing all possible sources of information.

One may think the design of a preparation and response plan to a mass victimization event is the sole responsibility of law enforcement and other public safety personnel. However the shared contention of conference participants was that effective crime prevention programs must take into account perspectives from multiple sources, as these events can occur anywhere at any time and will impact a variety of interests and organizations within the community. While not sole factors in determining who actually participates in specific preventative efforts, tapping police, social services, other public agencies (public utilities, for example), public and private schools, small and large businesses, churches, community groups and others to participate, on whatever scale, in designing a prevention and response plan to a possible occurrence of this kind of tragedy may be an important key to successfully interdicting and neutralizing any threats that may emerge.

### *Question to Consider*

- Who comprises my “community”?  
Typical community members participating in such efforts include, but are not limited to: law enforcement, corrections, courts, schools (primary, secondary, and institutions of higher education), mental health professionals and social service organizations, faith-based organizations, businesses, families, and other interested individuals or organizations. Roles often vary (some as caretakers, others as vigilant bystanders, and still others as active in threat assessment processes and procedures). Exact roles and responsibilities would be determined by individual locality needs.
- What is the strength of the relationship of law enforcement personnel to other entities and citizens in the community?
- Similarly, how can law enforcement personnel enhance relationships with community members?

### Additional resources:

- Bradford, Jackson, & Stanko (2009)
- Bratton with Knobler (1999)
- Carter (1995)
- Jackson & Bradford (2009)
- Jackson & Sunshine (2007)
- Kennedy (1996)
- Kochel (2012)

- LaFree (1998)
- Raphael & Ludwig (2003)
- Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls (1997)
- Sargeant, Wickes, & Mazerolle (2013)

### **3. Create and maintain open lines of communication between law enforcement and the local community.**

*“We can’t help everyone, but everyone can help someone.” – Ronald Reagan*

*Law enforcement agencies have historically been successful in considering the relative merits of creating and maintaining **transparency** when furthering partnerships with the community to both deliver public safety in general, as well as deter potential actors from engaging in behaviors that may result in harm to others whether individual or as groups. -Joint Publication of the IACP and COPS office (2009).*

This may seem obvious to even a casual reader. However, conference participants repeatedly contended that the reality in every community is that most individuals and organizations typically become focused upon the daily routines of life. In doing so, communication about potential threats and mitigation strategies are sometimes lost or overlooked amongst these routines. In contrast, however, in times of crisis (such as the mass casualty incidents under consideration here) many communities and their citizens pause to devote not only time, energy, and resources to the fallen victims in these incidents but also to examine the factors that may have led to the tragedies, as well as any indicators that, if acted upon, could have led to different outcomes.

As reflected in the “preparation” avenue discussed above, open and on-going communication to discuss the potential of these events occurring in your community may be the single most effective preventative strategy to pursue. By doing so, vulnerabilities, opportunities, challenges to be overcome in response plans, and similar issues may be identified. Creating action plans and identifying needed resources to address such issues may not only make the community safer but may also mitigate other types of threats such as gangs, drugs, and other illegal activities, that could potentially take root or flourish in a community.

Community policing scholars support the effectiveness of this approach (Bratton, 1999; Carter, 1995). The community policing approach is based on “the desirability of the police being responsive to individuals and groups without engaging in preferential treatment or discrimination.”<sup>10</sup> Officers are encouraged to establish rapport with members of the community by using nonbiased treatment, which should help build trust and legitimacy in local law enforcement. Community policing helps improve the legitimacy of the department while problem-oriented policing shows the strongest evidence for preventing crime.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, police legitimacy has been shown to help build neighborhood collective efficacy.<sup>12</sup> When citizens and local organizations invest more in their communities and feel that the police are responsive to their needs, they may be more willing to report behavior or threats that otherwise go unreported, thus allowing for increased potential prevention of mass casualty events. As such, by increasing collective efficacy through community policing initiatives, citizens become more invested stakeholders in the community and may be more willing to participate in preventative actions to protect themselves and others in the community.

### *Information Sharing*

To effectively communicate and design the aforementioned strategies, community partners will need to share information. The processes of sharing relevant information works best when people know and trust each other, again highlighting the need for community-oriented strategies that promote cooperation, responsiveness and investment by all impacted parties. At the core of this effort is a need to trust that the shared information will not be misused, both when given to law enforcement and when shared with any other relevant third party.

Implementing mechanisms for information sharing, while maintaining privacy and civil rights concerns, require an understanding of the different reporting laws in a given jurisdiction. Below are a number of privacy and civil rights regulations that are commonly discussed in this context. **This does not constitute legal advice**, but is provided for awareness of such issues that often arise in discussions for preventing mass casualty events. Individual jurisdictions will need to consult their respective legal counsel for specific guidance as to any initiatives that are considered. That noted, consider the following legal provisions that may require navigation for effective prevention efforts and successful threat assessments to be conducted to perhaps interdict in an emerging mass victimization incident:

- *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)*<sup>13</sup> – HIPAA was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1996 and is overseen by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The HIPAA privacy rule regulates the use and disclosure of protected health information. Below is a summary of the relevant information regarding

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<sup>10</sup> Roberg, Novak, & Cordner (2009, p. 22)

<sup>11</sup> Goldstein (1979, 2003); Sherman & Eck (2002)

<sup>12</sup> Goldstein (1987, 1993); Kochel (2012); Kochel, Parks, & Mastroski (2011)

<sup>13</sup> Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). (1996). “Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.” Pub. L. No. 104-191.

information-sharing:

- Disclosure of “protected health information” is allowed if the health provider makes a good faith determination that the disclosure:
  - “is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of a person or the public” or
  - “is made to a person or persons reasonably able to prevent or lessen the threat, including the target of the threat”
- For further information, refer to the following website:  
<http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html>
- *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)*<sup>14</sup> – FERPA is a federal law that protects the privacy of *student education records*. The law only applies to educational institutions that receive funding under a program administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). Below is a summary of the relevant information regarding information-sharing:
  - Law enforcement records created in furtherance of a law enforcement purpose are generally **not** considered education records. When an assessment team may be evaluating an individual, he or she may have come in contact with the law enforcement system. These records are not education records, even if an incident occurs on a university/college campus. This is important because what goes into a student record or to student affairs is subject to FERPA regulations, but not what generally goes into police records.
  - Personal observations are also **not** considered educational records.
    - Identify a point of contact for advice and information on these matters. Faculty, staff, and employees who encounter these legal or regulatory issues often require guidance, and a suitable process of information-sharing will likely be required.
  - Education record information *may be* shared among institutional employees who have a “legitimate education interest” in the individual.

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<sup>14</sup> Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1974).



- FERPA *does* allow for the reporting of information regarding a graduated high school student of concern to their prospective college or university or if the student has transferred between schools.
- *Note:* A document published in November 2008 by the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) titled “Joint Guidance on the Application of the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)* and the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)* to Student Health Records” documents detailed information on how these two legal mandates may intersect. More recent guidance may also be available from either DOE or DHHS.<sup>15</sup>
- Further information relative to both HIPAA and FERPA can be found at the FBI website as noted here: <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-incident>. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Education provides further information for the general public at the following website: <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/hottopics/index.html>.
- *The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (1990; The Clery Act)*<sup>16</sup> – The Clery Act was named in memory of a student who was killed in her dormitory room in 1986. In 2008, after the shootings at Virginia Tech, Congress amended the act by requiring a campus emergency response plan.
  - Campuses are now required to “immediately notify” the entire campus community as soon as an emergency is confirmed. See American Council on Education (2012) for further information on the *Clery Act*.
  - Such information-sharing and notification is permitted under *FERPA* regulations.
- *Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California* , 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 – This was a California Supreme Court case which determined that mental health professionals have a duty to protect individuals who are being threatened with bodily harm by a patient. These famous words came from the majority opinion: "The public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins." The original 1974 case mandated simply warning the threatened individual. However, a 1976 rehearing of the case determined that “duty to protect” the intended victim means the professional can

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services & U.S. Department of Education (1998). Available at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/hipaaferpajointguide.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> American Council on Education (2012). Available at <http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/A-Presidents-Guide-to-the-Clery-Act.pdf>

discharge this duty. While each state has codified this Tarasoff principle to its own suitability it is slightly different from locality to locality depending upon state statutes. As such, generalized statements about these requirements should be viewed with caution. Nonetheless, consider the following two bullets that may be actionable under specific conditions:

- The mental health professional can notify police, warn the intended victim, and/or take other reasonable steps to protect the threatened individual.
  - This decision has been adopted by most U.S. states and has been widely influential outside the U.S. as well. However, it is wise to check your state and local statutes on these matters.
- *American Psychiatric Association (APA) Code of Ethics*<sup>17</sup> – Under the APA Code of Ethics, otherwise-privileged information may be disclosed without consent “where permitted by law for a valid purpose such as to protect the client/patient, psychologist, or others from harm”.

#### *Further Information for Consideration*

The common notion held by many conference participants was that, once versed in the privacy and civil rights regulations for information-sharing, these provisions may actually be less restrictive than originally perceived to be when it comes to exigent needs to prevent violent outcomes.

An understanding of information sharing thresholds (both internal and external to any threat assessment team) *BEFORE* a situation arises is likely the best path to overcome obstacles that will inevitably, and possibly unnecessarily, arise in the heat of an emergent threat.

For a threat assessment team, establishing a single point of contact for information-sharing within the team (i.e., Police Chief/Sheriff, public health administrator, city council member, etc.) may facilitate trust and seamless flow of information when requested. Established threat assessment teams generally do not have to share information outside of the team unless it is required as part of a criminal investigation or some other legal provision that requires disclosure.

With regards to information-sharing on a national level, some have suggested that one effective avenue would be the creation of a national centralized location for reporting incidents and individuals of concern. Of course, there are privacy and civil liberties considerations that are likely to emerge with such an effort. So even as promising as such an information resource

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<sup>17</sup> APA Ethics Code. Available at <http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/principles.pdf>

might be to violence prevention efforts, a number of legal and practical hurdles will likely hinder such efforts. That noted, reviews of previous mass victimization incidents have suggested such capabilities may have some benefit. Select examples are provided below:

- The Department of Defense's (DoD) Defense Science Board's task force on Predicting Violent Behavior analyzed the mass shooting incident at Fort Hood by focusing its efforts on access to military facilities and personnel that pose threats of targeted violence. While the task force proposed numerous recommendations for threat management and prevention, the recommendations for national threat information-sharing were most provoking.<sup>18</sup>

After the tragic shooting at Fort Hood in November 2009, the President of the United States convened a meeting of his key officials, the heads of intelligence and security agencies, and personnel from DoD to assess what went wrong. Similar to findings from other inquiries of this nature, this panel found that: "reluctance to share time-critical and sometimes sensitive information to the right people, both interdepartmentally and with external partners" may have played a role in the outcome (pp. 37-38). While improved communication between stakeholders is clearly identified here as a benefit, this is not the same as a national center or repository of information that may be accessed by a variety of parties. Nonetheless, this task force identified many complexities surrounding the types of information to be shared, how often it should be shared, and with whom the information should be shared. Many, but not all, of these complexities centered around the sharing of medical history information as noted above in reference to HIPAA requirements.

- The Congressional Research Service report on public mass shootings outlined prevention, preparedness, and response while addressing implications for law enforcement, public health, and education (Bjelopera, Bagalman, Caldwell, Finklea, & McCallion, 2013).<sup>19</sup>

With regards to sharing information, Bjelopera et al. (2013) suggest one potential option could be to create a criminal watchlist, similar to the Terrorist Screening Database to be used for background checks when purchasing firearms, etc.<sup>20</sup> While the merits and detractions of such an approach are not being advocated one way or the other by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, deliberations by localities and other authorities as to the positives and negatives of such an approach that may arise are summarized below:

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<sup>18</sup> U.S. DoD, Defense Science Board (2012)

<sup>19</sup> This analysis utilized an older definition of "mass killings". The current definition of "3 or more killed" is noted on page 7 and sourced in footnote 3 of this report.

<sup>20</sup> Bjelopera, Bagalman, Caldwell, Finklea, & McCallion (2003)

- The more important benefits to this approach include, but are not limited to:
  - An increased likelihood of identifying patterns in individuals across localities and across time.
  - The potential to both identify and support threat-based inquiries with catalogued information not available to others.
  - Provide potential leads for threat assessment professionals to corroborate or ameliorate threats.
  
- The drawbacks to this approach include, but are not limited to:
  - Establishing criteria that are both functional and respectful to Constitutional rights for adding an individual to the list once a threat assessment has been executed.
  - Determining how law enforcement can engage with the community, including mental health professionals, once an individual has been added to the criminal watch list.
  - Determining who would monitor a criminal watch list once established.

An overwhelming amount of information would exist in one location, which may serve as an added possibility for false positives and the potential for misuse of information.

### *Questions to Consider*

- Similar to issues raised earlier in this document, if a mass casualty event were to occur in my community, what, when, where, and how might an incident of this nature unfold? Who would immediately need to be contacted? Is there an established point of contact (POC)? Is the POC's contact information readily available?
- Based upon information gleaned from the answers to the previous questions, what scenarios are possible and which of those would be more or less likely to unfold within my community? Would current communication systems and relationships between community partners withstand a mass casualty event? What communications failures can be anticipated and addressed now?
- What efforts would be needed to not only identify these potential threats but also build prevention and mitigation strategies rather than concentrating upon tactics for responding

to the tragedy once it has occurred? How can open communication foster these strategies?

- What partnerships exist or are required to create or enhance relationships in order to generate the required resources to prevent and respond to such events, if they were to come to fruition?
- What legal, policy, and practice provisions are there in my community governing information sharing which must be considered in efforts to prevent and respond to mass casualty events?
- Are there any clarifications or legal opinions needed to better guide my community in regard to information sharing?
- Is there a best practice for managing the information garnered from this process?
- What legal issues must be confronted for such violence prevention efforts to take place?
- What use, if any, would a watch list provide? How helpful, harmful, and what legal issues arise if such a cataloguing effort were employed to prevent these outcomes?

Additional resources on policing, prevention and information sharing:

- Drysdale, Modzeleski & Simons (2010)
- Florence et al. (2011)
- Gebo & Kirkpatrick (2002)
- Jones & Supinski (2010)
- LaFree & Dugan (2009)
- LaFree et al. (2013)
- Oliver (2006)
- Roberg, Novak, & Cordner (2009)
- Sherman & Eck (2002)
- Tocco (2014)

#### **4. Create and manage a threat assessment team or an equivalent capability.**

While the threat of a mass casualty event is real but rare, the consequences of such an event are catastrophic. Like the threat of terrorism, the threat posed by mass casualty events is similarly regarded as a low base rate phenomenon. That is, since relatively few incidents have occurred historically, the relative risk of other general crimes occurring is much greater. Just as hurricanes, floods, terrorism, and serial killings are relatively rare events, communities still devote resources to combat such instances when they do occur. Similarly, precautionary steps to

prepare for the unlikely circumstance that a mass casualty event may occur should be considered. In this vein, preparing to respond to a mass casualty event of any kind, as well as attempting to prevent such an outcome, has the same goal—to save lives. Consider the promise of threat assessment capabilities.

In 2010, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) approved a report titled *A Risk Analysis Standard for Natural and Man-Made Hazards to Higher Education Institutions*, which recommends “that Threat Assessment Teams be put into place on campus to help identify potential persons of concern and gather and analyze information regarding the potential threat posed by an individual(s)”. (See also DOD’s DSB Task Force on Predicting Violent Behavior, Sept, 2012)

A similar threat management process should be adopted to help identify and successfully manage potential persons of concern within the community at large, not only within the campus setting. Some conference participants also suggested that this process could include critical threat assessments of not only persons, but also physical locations in order to harden targets. However, such assessments are beyond the scope of typical threat assessments of persons and more in the realm of physical security assessment methodologies which are beyond the scope of this report.<sup>21</sup>

In recent years institutions of higher education have established and implemented threat assessment teams. Therefore, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. For specific guidance, Deisinger, Randozzo, O’Neill, and Savage (2008) and Randozzo and Plummer (2009) are informative resources for additional assistance with the creation and administration of threat assessment teams and threat management.

Although beyond the scope of this document, the following sources, among many others, can provide additional insights on *how to conduct* threat assessments:

- Harris & Lurigio (2012)
- O’Toole (2000)
- Romano, Levi-Minzi, Rugala, & Van Hasselt (2011)
- Rugala & Isaacs (2003)
- U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (2004)
- U.S. Secret Service and Department of Education (2002)

The creation of a threat management capability that is dedicated to violence prevention allows for specialized policing responses to individuals who exhibit concerning behaviors indicative of violent intent. These capabilities are often characterized as prioritizing treatment over criminal

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<sup>21</sup> Strict adherence to tradecraft verbiage would suggest that such an environmental vulnerability assessment is not a threat assessment per se.

justice system involvement where appropriate and partnering with community leaders and citizens when possible.<sup>22</sup> These efforts also often include, where feasible, an anonymous tip line for reporting potential threats.

- The two most prevalent approaches of this nature are Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs) (Compton et al, 2006; Compton et al, 2008; Strauss et al, 2005; Teller et al, 2006) and police-mental health co-responder teams (Cloud & Davis, 2013).
  - The CIT officers, who are specially trained, not only can respond to crises, but can also follow-up on individuals who have been identified as a risk for potentially violent behavior.
  - Law enforcement officers and mental health professionals work together to follow-up on tips and do wellness checks on concerning individuals.
  - The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) supports the use of CITs as a means for more successfully responding to and managing cases that involve persons with possible mental illnesses.<sup>23</sup>

More significant benefits can be realized if the officer and mental health professional also work together as part of the community threat assessment team. When creating a community threat assessment team, no one-size-fits-all approach exists. Evaluating the capabilities currently available in the community is the most prudent course to pursue. Any deficits identified can be addressed incrementally. The important task is to build a threat assessment capability in the community and refine that capability as the needs and resources of the community are identified.

As defined in the introduction, threat assessment is a systematic process designed to 1) *identify* situations of concern, 2) gather *information* 3) *assess* information and situations, and 4) *manage* those situations (Deisinger et al., 2008; see also Fein, Vossekuil and Holden 1995, 1998).

- It is important to note that an individual displaying concerning behaviors is not automatically a threat to other individuals or the community. Further evaluation by appropriate and qualified authorities is required to make such a determination.
- When deciding how to manage threatening situations, there is a difference between behavioral intervention and threat response. Behavioral interventions occur when a threat

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<sup>22</sup> Reuland, Draper, & Norton (2012).

<sup>23</sup> See “Improving Officer Response to Persons with Mental Illness”, International Association of Chiefs of Police (2010) and can be found at [www.theiacp.org](http://www.theiacp.org).

assessment is completed and an action plan for intervention is executed. Whereas, threat responses are varied and may differ widely from counseling approaches to more incapacitation tactics. For clarity, consider:

- According to Calhoun and Weston (2003), an intervention refers to a process or action that is intended to modify behavior, thinking, or emotions. As such, interventions in threat assessment or threat management may be any actions taken to manage the threat. These may include, but are not limited to, interviewing or monitoring the referred individual.<sup>24</sup>
- A threat response refers to the course of action that takes place pursuant to establishment of a viable dangerous situation or person.

The key here is to have a systematic process for the threat assessment, not simply a team of individuals that are brought together for this purpose. A formalized or articulated process will help to establish a centralized awareness, facilitate thorough and contextual assessments, supervise case management, and monitor and reassess situations on a *longitudinal* basis as required.

All members of a threat assessment team must have basic training in the mechanics of threat assessment, and additional training over time is equally essential to keep team members informed of up-to-date, relevant information. For example, additional training pertaining to recognition and awareness of procedures to leverage new technologies (i.e., social media, SnapChat, etc.) may be required for individuals to adequately identify the language and conventions used to communicate in differing forms of social media.

### *Implementation*

- Implementing a threat assessment capability or team usually requires defining who should participate in such an effort. While the exact composition will vary from community to community, common participants in university-based efforts<sup>25</sup> include: student services, student counseling, faculty and faculty advisors, administrators, academic affairs, police and security personnel, community members, human resources, university counsel, and residence life personnel as appropriate and necessary.
- The composition of a community threat assessment team is typically dependent upon the situation that is being assessed. Therefore, it could vary for each situation. The roles or agencies being represented may not need to be present at each threat assessment based

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<sup>24</sup> Bulling & Scalora (2013). Available at <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publicpolicypublications/123>

<sup>25</sup> Modeled off of the Campus Threat Assessment Team for centralized reporting (Deisinger et al., 2008).




upon the situation and individual of concern. For example, if a high school student is being assessed, it is unlikely that University personnel would be required during the deliberations. Who comprises a threat assessment capability or team is as critical as the skills that are required to conduct such assessments. As noted earlier, some common personnel known to participate in these efforts include, but are not limited to: qualified mental health professionals (who are not treating the subject of interest); clergy; state, local, and county law enforcement; school resource officers or counselors (or participants from relevant school threat assessment teams, if they exist); participants from any Campus Threat Assessment Team that may exist; participants from campus law enforcement, where available and appropriate; employment supervisors; business owners; participants from relevant Employee Assistance Programs, if applicable to the situation; representatives from the local Chamber of Commerce; and, while controversial, some include representatives from the media.

- Depending on the situation being assessed and available resources, different threat assessment team participants may take the lead on the evaluation of any given threat.
- At outset, of course, a systematic threat assessment process requires creating a capability of assessing the credibility of a reported threat. This is essential in determining when, and if, convening a threat assessment team is even necessary.
- Conference attendees also contended that, when required, it is critical to also create and maintain a reporting protocol directed toward informing the individual(s) or entities that notified authorities of the threat as to the outcome of the case. Otherwise the likelihood that the community will continue to report suspicious behavior will likely deteriorate as a lack of trust in the processes employed will inevitably result.

A potential process for executing a Community Threat Assessment capability is depicted below; it is important to remember that this process may vary from community to community, as well as

vary based on the nature of the threat and the particular circumstances that come to light:



While this is a general diagram or flowchart of how a given threat assessment capability may function, other variations can be found (see especially Deisinger et al. 2008 for a variation on this illustration). In fact, the FBI is currently developing a monograph reflecting best practices in this realm to behavioral predicate identification, threat assessment, and threat management which will likely leverage, in whole or in part, the general approach here but, as in any assessment strategy, may vary from that detailed here. This effort is currently expected to be completed sometime in 2016.

It is important to note as well that specific assessment procedures will sometimes vary but generally reflect the principles summarized here. Nonetheless, several important factors may be particularly useful to consider in any threat assessment process. These include, but are not limited to the following:

- Consider the source of the reported threat. Is the report credible? This determination dictates whether the assessment process progresses or is terminated as not viable at the outset.

- Once established or formalized, a threat assessment team may hold regular meetings (e.g., once a month) or meet as needed but should also be available to assemble in an emergency.
- If there is a college or university in the jurisdiction where a threat has been uncovered, there may be a college or university-based threat assessment team that can assist. As noted earlier, incorporating a representative from these existing teams when necessary may be helpful.
- A threat assessment team will also have to devise its own processes for documentation and recordkeeping of situations that are assessed (see Deisinger et al., 2008 for an example used in institutions of higher education). Such documentation commonly includes a recordkeeping system for individuals who have been evaluated and whether an identified threat was substantiated. Other information commonly includes, but is not limited to, incident descriptions, subject details, possible targets, and any available witness information. Storage, security, and retrieval of this information, as well as subsequent follow-ups on cases, would comprise some of the ongoing tasks required of a threat assessment capability or team.

#### *Issues to Consider with Storing Information*

- A specialized threat management capability within a law enforcement agency would also likely require establishing its own information and records management system for subjects of concern. The content and structure of such an information system are beyond the scope of this effort but these issues would also need to be deliberated as invariably questions will be raised that require such information to be available if requested.
- Identify an entity or “role” on the community threat assessment team to secure, monitor, and conduct follow-up on cases.
- Determine how long to keep cases “open” and in the system.
- Determine how to manage access to the recordkeeping system by the various entities involved in the threat assessment team. With a potentially large team, there is also the need to mitigate any risk of abuse and misuse of information.

### *Questions to Consider*

- Which entities should participate in a threat assessment team in my community?
- If a college/university is present in the area, how can a community's threat assessment capability or team leverage efforts by collaborating with any existing campus threat assessment process?
- What resources are available in my community in order to fund the implementation of a threat assessment capability or team?
- How can law enforcement agencies leverage resources to foster a threat management capability to respond to this and similar problems that emerge in my community?
- Does having a separate threat management capability require hiring additional personnel?
- What would be the structure, content, access controls, etc. of a records management system used by the threat assessment team/capability?

### Additional resources:

- Bulling & Scalora (2013)
- Calhoun & Weston (2003)
- Collins (2007)
- Cornell (2010)
- Cornell et al. (2004)
- Cornell et al. (2009)
- Deisinger et al. (2008)
- Dunkle, Silverstein, & Warner (2008)
- Fein, Vossekuil, & Holden (1995)
- Randazzo et al. (2006)
- U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education (2011)

## **5. Support and enhance plans for education and awareness in the community.**

One of the most important aspects of preventing mass casualty events is to empower everyone in the community to become partners in working together and striving for prevention.

- In order to do this, as noted previously, conference participants believed it was important to combat notions such as “this does not directly affect me” or “that could never happen here” in order to facilitate the reporting of possible risk.<sup>26</sup>

Implementing a community threat assessment model is just one component to preventing mass casualty events. Educating the community and following any known best practices for risk assessment processes are equally important.

- Creating trusting relationships among every member of the community is the foundation of effective policing (see Sir Robert Peele, 1829) and such efforts afford mass casualty prevention, as well as other public safety rewards.

Conference attendees also contended that successful threat assessment efforts share common threads in terms of structure, function, composition. Some of these are noted below:

- Conducting combined trainings, workshops, and/or town hall meetings, where appropriate, with the community in order to foster outreach and communication.
  - Law enforcement may be the appropriate agency to bring community groups together and *facilitate* these efforts. However, other parties could also spearhead such efforts. For example, perhaps the local department of public health or the city council (if possible and appropriate), or other local, state, or federal partners can be sought out as sponsors of these events as some believe that individuals in the community may feel more comfortable participating in these events if they are not solely sponsored by law enforcement.
  - Tailoring each community training effort based upon the community members attending may lead to more successful outcomes. Each training effort could include, but not be limited to, awareness of behavioral indicators, how to report, whom to report to, and common barriers to reporting.<sup>27</sup> Any bystander training presents numerous and complex challenges. Does creating community awareness relative to potential behavioral indicators of violence risk developing overly cautious and undertrained “assessors” who screen and fail to report problematic behaviors? Similarly, does encouraging a “see something, say something” approach risk flooding local responding agencies with an overwhelming number of false positive reports?

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<sup>26</sup> See both Papparazzo, Eith, and Tocco (2013) as well as Tocco (2013) for similar considerations of both risk and prevention.

<sup>27</sup> Some common barriers include, but are not limited to, legal requirements pertaining to duties to report or not, privacy concerns, fear of the person being reported, desires to avoid conflict, potential misuse of information, lack of referral tools, parental reluctance to report child, guilt, difficulty in establishing what is or is not normal, and the notion that minor infractions would receive the maximum penalty with no assessment being conducted (zero-tolerance policies).

- Reassuring the community that something will be done when a report is made is another essential message such training will produce. Focusing on the message of assisting someone who needs help, along with any possible public service announcements and/or campaigns to create community awareness of what to do in these situations, may be one of the keys to successful prevention efforts.

### *Structuring Community Meetings*

Having members of the threat assessment team or capability present at many, if not all, community training and outreach meetings may be beneficial if feasible. Cross-training may also complement prevention efforts, thus combined trainings should be offered whenever possible.

- Typical attendees at such outreach efforts include participants from the medical community, mental health professionals, schools (primary, secondary, and higher education), faith-based organizations, neighborhood associations, faculty and staff from schools, other public health officials, and parents and students as appropriate and necessary.
- It is important to educate community members on the common *barriers* to reporting (reasons why individuals do not come forward) in hopes that they will overcome them (see Tocco, 2013 as well as footnote 12).

### *Other Community Strategies*

- For new and incoming college students, it has been suggested to add information into student orientation and information packets relative to the threat of such incidents at the start of the program. This will allow the student to have all the necessary information all in one place to help prevent such occurrences. This approach is also being debated as to the merits for primary and secondary school settings. However, no matter what strategies are employed, individual communities must decide whether and what type of training might be given to school age children as deemed necessary and appropriate.
- Many security companies, as well as the FBI and other governmental agencies, offer training on mass casualty responses to law enforcement. Some also provide these services pertaining to businesses with respect to workplace violence. Potential useful resources for training and awareness can be found at the Federal Emergency Management Agency website as there are constant updates in their instructional guides and other materials devoted to this and similar topics. These can be found at <http://www.fema.gov>.

- Many colleges and universities and even some high schools now have recommended or mandatory practices for assessing and responding to threats on their campuses. For example, the Commonwealth of Virginia sponsored the production of a report entitled “Recommended Practices for Virginia College Threat Assessment” which details practices for implementing Code of Virginia 23-9.2:10 which mandates that “Each public college or university shall have in place policies and procedures for the prevention of violence on campus, including assessment and intervention with individuals whose behavior poses a threat to the safety of the campus community.”<sup>28</sup> Students are a part of the solution as well. Many instances of alleged thwarted attacks have been reported and the empirical data supports this contention in that a 2008 study conducted by the Secret Service and the Department of Education underscored this notion in its findings that information learned by students may prevent tragic outcomes (Pollack, Modzeleski, & Rooney, 2008). Caution should be exercised in generalizing these results as the sample in this study was small but the promise of reporting of information learned by peers is what is of merit here.
  
- Parents are also a part of the solution. Providing them with strategies to help and be helped may pay dividends. Parents are most likely to notice behaviors of their children and friends of their children beforehand. On the same hand, it is not uncommon, nor unexpected, that parents and other family members may be reluctant to both identify and report potentially violent children or other family members to law enforcement. Oftentimes, they just need to know what behaviors are noteworthy for alerting authorities for potential action to prevent a dangerous or violent outcome.
  - The goal is to prevent potential violent outcomes. An objective in support of that goal is to assist individuals who are exhibiting indicators of potentially violent behavior, as well as their families, without being offensive or violating privacy in order to mitigate such outcomes. Perhaps consulting or utilizing a mental health advocate where appropriate can be useful. Typically, early intervention is always better.
  
- *Bottom Line:* In any community, education and awareness can be utilized to determine what works for your jurisdiction based upon staffing, availability, and resources. Schools and universities that have established threat assessment and interdiction strategies may prove to be an efficient and effective force multiplier in any effort to enhance community safety.

### *Questions to Consider*

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<sup>28</sup> See Cornell (2009).

- What can law enforcement do to promote awareness among the members of my community?
- What can law enforcement do to motivate members of my community to attend and participate in awareness and prevention meetings?
- What can law enforcement do to reach out to members of my community who choose not to participate in such efforts?
- What can law enforcement do to assist members of my community to overcome some of the commonly identified barriers to reporting?

Additional resources:

- Borum et al. (2010)
- Richardson, Brown, & Van Brakle (2013)
- Peterson, Larson, & Skiba (2001)
- Pollack, Modzeleski, & Rooney (2008)
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (2004, 2013)

## 6. Understand the myths of mental illness.

*“It is simplistic, as well as inaccurate to say the cause of violence among mentally ill individuals is the mental illness itself; instead...mental illness is clearly relevant to violence risk but its causal roles are complex, indirect, and embedded in a web of other (and arguably more) important individual and situational co-factors to consider.” –Elbogen and Johnson (2009)*

When discussing mass victimization events, it is important to understand the myths of mental illness. There are several myths of mental illness, which may be fueled by the media and the public’s reaction to these events.

When it comes to data pertaining to reported criminal homicides, a Bureau of Justice Statistics report on homicide trends in the United States between 1980 and 2008 shows no specific trend in the proportion of multiple homicides (two or more victims); the prevalence of this crime has been stable at about 4.5% over time. The number of homicides involving three or more victims increased during the same time period, however, the overall total has remained under 1% of all



homicides each year. In 2008, 77.2% of homicides involving multiple victims involved a gun. Yet, none of these statistical analyses demonstrate that homicides are more or less likely to be perpetrated by individuals with mental illness which leaves conclusions relative to such a correlation elusive.<sup>29</sup> Instead myths relative to mental illness often persist.

Among the myths of mental illness are the following:

- **Myth #1:** Individuals with a mental illness pose a risk of violence to the public.
  - When a mass victimization event is perpetrated by an individual with a history of mental illness, it raises the question, *Are individuals with mental illness more prone to violence?* While some of the most recent incidents have been alleged to have been perpetrated by individuals with a history of mental illness, such as the Virginia Tech and Newtown shootings where the offenders had exposure to prior mental health care, not all perpetrators have been diagnosed with a mental illness.<sup>30</sup> Research has shown that, in general, individuals with mental illness are no more violent than individuals without mental illness (Monahan et al., 2001).<sup>31</sup>
  - Similarly, not everyone who is a violence risk has a mental illness. Prior studies have found that individuals with mental illness are more frequently victims rather than the perpetrators of violent crime (Swanson, 2012a; Swanson, 2012b; Swanson, 2012c).
- **Myth #2:** Individuals with a mental illness need to be evaluated for risk of violent behavior.
  - Not all individuals with a mental illness are a threat to behave violently. Individuals with mental illness are typically not the violent individuals the public perceives them to be. Only those individuals who have been referred to a threat assessment team by a concerned entity in the community should be subject to evaluation by a threat assessment team.

Goffman (1963) suggested that the stigma attached to diagnoses of “mental illness” negatively influences outcomes for mental health patients. Rosenfield (1997) concluded that mental health patients who experience a high level of stigmatization and lack access to quality mental health services have lower life satisfaction. Both of these research findings illustrate some of the complexities of managing mental illnesses. These findings relative to individuals suffering from

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<sup>29</sup> Cooper & Smith (2011)

<sup>30</sup> Sedensky III (2013) and Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007)

<sup>31</sup> But also see Borum (2000) for some exceptions to this general notion pertaining to correlates of specific mental health illnesses to violence among juveniles.

diagnosed mental illnesses also complicate efforts when the necessity arises for examining behavioral issues in individuals reported to be of concern. When behaviors do materialize that are of concern there is a need to assess potential risks for violence. However, such a mix of factors makes the assessment process even more difficult and complex.

### *Questions to Consider*

- How can healthcare and mental health professionals help dispel some of the myths surrounding mental illness in my community?
- How can concerned parties identify potential warning signs of violent behavior and report these to mental health and public safety officials?
- How can mental health professionals assist in educating my community about issues in mental health as it relates to violence?

### Additional resources:

- Corrigan & Shapiro (2010)
- Corrigan & O'Shaughnessy (2007)
- Nielssen et al. (2011)

## **7. Conduct table-top exercises on prevention within the community with key community leaders and members of the threat assessment team in order to enhance prevention and response capabilities.**

*Conducting table-top exercises with key players and members of the threat assessment team allows for a collaborative effort to resolve or diminish potential threat situations.*

Conducting a table-top exercise (a class room execution of a particular prevention and response scenario) which involves major members of the community, where appropriate, and members of the threat assessment team on an annual basis will provide significant rewards. Such efforts will increase information-sharing and reporting of threats as these exercises serve to remind individual community members that such threats, while unlikely for most, are nonetheless possible in every community. Similar exercises have been found useful in counterterrorism, as well as preparing for hurricanes, tornadoes, or other natural disasters.

Examples of the table-top exercises conducted at this meeting are provided in Appendix C.

Some of the benefits of conducting table-top exercises in a community include, but are not limited to:

- Creating an opportunity to identify any major problems or discuss any issues the community might be experiencing relative to a particular threat.
- Forging partnerships and instilling trust among first-responders, businesses, and government leaders that will inevitably be a part of an actual response.
- Streamlining lines of communication and identifying efficient and effective responses that are required should an actual event occur.

#### *Questions to Consider*

- What is the viability of conducting table-top or field exercises in my community?
- How can such a table-top exercise be initiated?
- What resources are required for such an exercise to be executed?
- Are there funds available from other entities (such as the state or federal government) to initiate such a table-top exercise?
- Who would be appropriate in my community to participate in an effort of this kind?

Additional resources on emergency preparedness and response:

- Corrigan & Watson (2004)
- Hsu, Li, Bavram, Levinson, Yang, & Monahan (2013)
- Link et al. (1989)
- Masterson, Steffen, Brin, Kordick, & Christos (2012)
- Murano & Rungay (2000)
- Soomaroo & Murray (2012)
- Taylor & Gunn (1999)

## Summary and Conclusion

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When communities are struck by tragedies such as mass casualty events, law enforcement will always respond, aid in saving lives, and rigorously seek to apprehend those who perpetrate such acts. This monograph represents the deliberations of an invited set of experts that convened at the FBI Academy in August of 2013 to examine promising avenues for preventing mass casualty incidents. This assembled group of experts debated the dimensions of this problem by examining recent cases, discussing lessons learned in the communities that were touched by these events, and debating what, if any, information could have contributed to preventing these outcomes. In addition, working group members had the opportunity to examine a set of integrated case scenarios (see Appendix C) to assist in identifying any efforts that might prove viable for communities to pursue efforts to prevent such occurrences.

From this work, seven avenues for contributing to possible prevention efforts were delineated. Clearly, a mass victimization event can occur anywhere and prevention of all cases is likely impossible. There is currently no agreed upon single strategy or predictive means for preventing mass victimization events due to a variety of situational complexities and environmental factors that influence eventual outcomes. As such, rather than attempting to predict who will or will not perpetrate such tragedies, this document sought to identify promising avenues for prevention. As noted earlier, each community throughout the country is likely to be different and the viability of any given preventative strategy will have to be weighed locally.

Nonetheless, it is hoped that the avenues defined and discussed here will be considered by local communities in their efforts to prevent violent events that result in mass casualties. The pathways identified here may also contribute to more effective police-citizen relations, create opportunities to prevent other criminal behavior from occurring, and enhance public safety efforts in general. As such, the avenues identified here may be viable to some communities and not as helpful to other localities where these events or similar tragedies may have previously occurred and prevention efforts are already underway. For this reason, it is recommended that each community evaluate the avenues offered here as options to be considered in conjunction with, or as a complement to, any current efforts to examine ways to prevent such tragic events from unfolding.

While some ideas identified here will provide concrete guidance to some communities, others may find that existing community efforts already encompass such pathways for preventing these incidents. Ultimately, due to the recent tragedies of this nature that have occurred in places like

Aurora, CO and Newtown, CT, many, if not all, communities are already engaged in efforts to examine the potential threats that similar incidents may pose to the health and safety of their citizens.

If this monograph informs any of these deliberations, in even the smallest of ways, and, as a result, contributes to the formulation of a viable strategy for attempting to prevent these mass casualty incidents, then the tasks and debates that the working group engaged in will have proven fruitful. The hope and aim of all the parties that contributed to the development and documentation of the strategies presented here is to provide some light toward potential paths toward either preventing or deterring such incidents from occurring in the future.

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## Appendix A

### Mass Victimization: Promising Avenues for Prevention

#### Meeting Agenda

##### **Tuesday, August 6, 2013**

- 8:00 – 8:30            Welcome  
SSA Bradley V. Bryant, Unit Chief, FBI Behavioral Science Unit (BSU)
- Overview: Why Are We Here?  
Dr. John P. Jarvis, Chief Criminologist, BSU
- 8:30 – 9:00            Introductions
- 9:00 – 10:30          **Case Presentation #1**  
FBI Phoenix, Tucson Resident Agency- ASAC Annette Bartlett
- 10:30 – 10:45        *BREAK*
- 10:45 – 11:45        **Case Presentation #2**  
FBI Albany- SA Bill Huba
- 11:45- 12:15        **Case Presentation #3**  
Colorado Springs, Colorado- Former Police Chief Richard Myers
- 12:15 – 1:30         *LUNCH*
- 1:30 – 3:00           **Mass Violence: Pre-Attack Behaviors and Indicators**  
UC Andre Simons, Behavioral Analysis Unit-2
- 3:00 – 4:30           **Break-Out Group Sessions #1**
- 4:30 – 5:00           Wrap-Up Day One  
Travel Documents  
Ms. Amber Scherer – Behavioral Science Unit, FBI

##### **Wednesday, August 7, 2013**

- 8:00 – 8:30            Welcome, Recap Day One
- 8:30 – 10:00         **Presentation of Prevention Model**

Virginia Tech- Major Gene Deisinger, Deputy Chief of Police and  
Director, Threat Management Services

10:00 – 10:15

*BREAK*

10:15 – 11:30

**Break-Out Group Sessions #2**

11:30 – 1:00

*LUNCH*

1:00 – 2:30

**Expanding to Prevention within the Community**

Chief Ariana Roddini, Behavioral Science Division  
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center  
Amber Scherer, FBI Behavioral Science Unit

2:30 – 3:00

*BREAK*

3:00 – 4:00

**Break-Out Group Sessions #3**

4:00 – 5:00

Group Discussion

**Thursday, August 8, 2013**

8:00 – 8:30

Overview Prevention Models

8:30 – 9:00

**Overview Table Top Exercise**

Dr. John Jarvis & Ms. Amber Scherer

9:00 – 11:30

**Break-Out Group Session #4**

11:30 – 1:00

*LUNCH*

1:00 – 2:30

**Break-Out Group Sessions Continued**

2:30 – 3:00

*BREAK*

3:00 – 4:00

**Group Briefings**

4:30 – 5:00

**All Scenario Discussion**

5:00 – 5:30

**Discussion of Next Steps  
Wrap-Up and Thank You**

## **Appendix B**

## **List of Participants**

Michael Buerger	Bowling Green State University Futures Working Group
Geoff Huff	Ames Police Department Futures Working Group
Justin Patchin	University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire Futures Working Group
Rick Myers	Retired Chief of Police Futures Working Group
Joseph Schafer	Southern Illinois University Futures Working Group
Annette Bartlett	ASAC, FBI Phoenix Division Tuscon Resident Agency
Gene Deisinger	Deputy Chief, Virginia Tech Police Department
Susan Riseling	Chief, University of Wisconsin
Bill Huba	FBI Albany Division
Val Atkins	Deputy Assistant Director, FLETC
Ariana Roddini	Unit Chief, Behavioral Science Division Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
Chuck Klink	Associate Vice Provost for Student Affairs Virginia Commonwealth University
Jeff Capps	Chief, College Station, TX Police Department
Amy Goldstein	Associate Director of Prevention Research National Institute of Mental Health
Barry Bratburd	Senior Policy Analyst, COPS Department of Justice
Christina Horst	International Association of Chiefs of Police
Courtney Marielle	International Association of Chiefs of Police

Jenny Gargano	International Association of Chiefs of Police
Andre Simons	Unit Chief, BAU-2, NCAVC Federal Bureau of Investigation
Yvonne Muirhead	NCAVC Federal Bureau of Investigation
Janelle Miller	Unit Chief, IVCU Federal Bureau of Investigation
Steve Sepeda	Unit Chief, VCU Federal Bureau of Investigation
Kevin Gutfleish	Unit Chief, CID Federal Bureau of Investigation
Debbie Brown	SIA, CID, Criminal Intelligence Section Federal Bureau of Investigation
Greg McMahan	IA, CID, Criminal Intelligence Section Federal Bureau of Investigation
Rhonda Sample	IA, CID, Criminal Intelligence Section Federal Bureau of Investigation
Chris Langert	Unit Chief, DTOU I Federal Bureau of Investigation
Bret Kirby	Unit Chief, DTOU II Federal Bureau of Investigation
Jacques Battiste	Office of Law Enforcement Coordination (OLEC)
John Jarvis	Chief Criminologist, Behavioral Science Unit Federal Bureau of Investigation
Amber Scherer	Contractor, Behavioral Science Unit Federal Bureau of Investigation
Brad Huff	Captain, FBI Police Federal Bureau of Investigation
Ray Chancellor	CSO, Training Division Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chris Combs

Section Chief, CIRG, SIOC  
Active Shooter Initiative  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bradley Bryant

Unit Chief, Behavioral Science Unit  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Marina Bontkowski

Research Scholar, Behavioral Science Unit  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

## Appendix C

### Table Top Exercises

#### Fictional Futures Scenario #1

On Thursday, February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2013, Mr. Frank Seal, a 36 year-old single Caucasian man with no children, left work very unhappy with his boss. He was passed up for a recent promotion and did not receive his most recent request for vacation. He felt extremely underappreciated and was fed up with the way he was being treated. Mr. Seal sees a psychiatrist once in a while, and is supposed to take medication, but has not been taking it regularly as his insurance does not cover it. His psychiatrist, Dr. Spring, has not officially diagnosed him with a mental illness. However, Mr. Seal has been seen in the Kansas City Prairie Ridge Hospital for mental health services in the past. It is believed that he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Mr. Seal works at Hoffman Construction, Inc. in Kansas City, KS. He left work at 3:34pm and drove the 20 minutes down I-35 to Overland Park Regional Medical Center in Overland Park, KS. It was his belief that the reason he was being underappreciated at work was his fault and the doctors at the hospital he was born at were to blame. Therefore, he needed to return to that hospital just down the road and kill the doctors so he would become appreciated and finally get his raise.

At 4:06pm, the dispatcher gets a call from the hospital. Someone has stormed their Emergency Room, erratic, crazy, and with a weapon (said to be loaded). The call immediately goes out to surrounding law enforcement agencies to respond. The first officer on the scene is there within 2.5 minutes. However, this is too late for the lives of the 12 victims he has already taken in the ER waiting \room. By this time, it is unknown if the shooter is still alive as he has proceeded to another area of the hospital. While law enforcement is deciding how to breach the building and get inside, precious lives are at stake. The SWAT team finally enters the building and by this time, a total of 26 victims have been killed and countless others injured. Mr. Seal had taken his own life with \_\_\_\_\_ (weapon) and SWAT found \_\_\_\_\_ other weapons in his possession.

#### Fictional Futures Scenario #2

On Thursday, February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2013, Mr. Douglas Sharp, a 45 year-old Caucasian man, entered ACME Insurance Company in Richmond, VA with a Bushmaster .223 caliber semi-automatic rifle with a high-capacity 30 round magazine and began firing. Mr. Sharp worked at ACME Insurance Company for approximately seven years and up until six months ago had nothing of interest in his personal file. That is when Ms. Stephanie Snow, a 32 year-old single woman, began working at ACME. Mr. Sharp was fired exactly one week ago because of sexual harassment and escalating crude sexual advances made towards Ms. Snow. In addition, over the



past six months, while too ashamed to report to their security officer, Ms. Snow has been receiving random late night phone calls from an unknown caller and has often felt unsafe walking to her home.

Mr. Sharp also believed that his love interest, Ms. Snow, was romantically involved with his supervisor. This only fueled his hatred for ACME Insurance Company. Immediately after being fired last Thursday, Mr. Sharp stormed out of his supervisor's office yelling and behaving aggressively towards everyone. Security had to escort him from the building. He was carried out while screaming threats towards his supervisor.

Mr. Sharp has no history of seeing a mental health professional. However, his ex-wife would report that he has a history of violent outbursts and mood swings. The semi-automatic rifle is registered in his name; he purchased the weapon from Southern Gun World in Richmond, VA on November 13, 2012. It is unknown at this time if the necessary background check was done.

### **Fictional Futures Scenario #3**

On Thursday, February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2013, a 16 year-old junior at Longview High School in Naperville, Illinois named Tyler Fisher decided to carry out a plan he had been contemplating for some time. Tyler spends his Friday and Saturday nights at home playing PS3, his favorite games are Call of Duty: Black Ops and Grand Theft Auto. In recent weeks since the new spring semester had started, Tyler has been the focus of the websites that most teenagers use (i.e., Facebook). Tyler does not have many friends and Tyler's family does not have a lot of money since his father left him and his mom two years ago. He has no one to talk about it. He does not talk to the school counselor or a therapist. He has no history of mental health problems.

At 9:17am that Thursday morning, Tyler arrived at the school during the change between first and second period. He was armed with a semi-automatic assault rifle, and two handguns, all having high-capacity magazines. He came in through the back door of the gym as he knew it would be empty during the change in classes and headed straight to the boys locker room. He started firing and unloaded his first clip, then headed to the girls locker room and unloaded another clip. After he was done in the gym he started down the hallway and started shooting in classrooms.

Unfortunately, Longview High School does not have a School Resource Officer on-site, nor do they have an Active Shooter Response plan. Therefore, none of their staff are trained in how to respond to these situations. The only thing that could be done was to call the police and hide, which was done once a teacher realized that shots were being fired. But this was not realized until Tyler left the girls locker room. And by then, it was too late for the lives of those

32 students dead, 14 injured, and 3 teachers dead and 2 injured. This all happened too quickly for those teachers to respond. Once law enforcement was notified, police were on the scene within four minutes, but it took another five minutes to assess the situation and figure out how to breach the building.

By that time, Tyler had made it to his second period math class at the end of the hallway from the gymnasium. There were a couple of students in this class who were particularly popular on the Facebook site known for bullying him. He simply walked into the classroom, pulled out one of the two handguns and killed himself.

#### **Fictional Futures Scenario #4**

On Saturday, March 30<sup>th</sup>, 2013, the doors opened at 2:00pm EST for the New York Yankees to play an exhibition game against the Army at the United States Military Academy at West Point's Johnson Stadium at Doubleday Field in West Point, NY. Mr. Vince Monroe, a 25 year-old, who had been dishonorably discharged from the Army, had tickets to the game and was planning on taking his girlfriend. About an hour before they were supposed to leave for the game, his girlfriend told him she could no longer go because she had to work, an excuse he did not believe. Mr. Monroe was forced to see a psychologist after being discharged six months ago, but has not seen anyone since.

Mr. Monroe always liked to be early to baseball games because he liked to watch batting practice, plus it was before a lot of the crowd arrived. He got to the stadium around 12:30pm and it was a little rainy that day so he decided he would get his rain poncho out of the trunk to wear. When he opened his trunk, he saw that he had stored his \_\_\_\_\_ (high-capacity magazines) gun in there since the last time he went shooting at the range. Because he was still so fired up and frustrated with his girlfriend not coming, and he did not believe she was actually working, something inside him told him to hide the weapon under his poncho and take it inside with him.

Mr. Monroe sat patiently during batting practice and through warm-ups. They had an Army veteran sing the National Anthem. When he sang "the bombs bursting in air," this got Mr. Monroe very excited and he started shooting his gun off. First he was shooting it into the air, and then he started shooting it at others around him. He took off running down the stairs, stopped, reloaded his magazine and then began shooting again. It took quite a few minutes for the police at the stadium to find him. By that time he had fired at least 20 rounds and was beginning to shoot from the next magazine. By the time he was spotted in the stadium full of thousands of people, the excitement had worn off, but he knew the damage had been done and there was no turning back. Mr. Monroe was eventually caught off guard, cornered, tackled, and arrested.